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Mind wandering episodes have been construed as periods of “stimulus-independent”
thought, where our minds are decoupled from the external sensory environment.
In two experiments, we used behavioral and event-related potential (ERP) measures
to determine whether mind wandering episodes can also be considered as periods
of “response-independent” thought, with our minds disengaged from adjusting our
behavioral outputs. In the first experiment, participants performed a motor tracking task
and were occasionally prompted to report whether their attention was “on-task” or “mind
wandering.” We found greater tracking error in periods prior to mind wandering vs. on-task
reports. To ascertain whether this finding was due to attenuation in visual perception
per se vs. a disruptive effect of mind wandering on performance monitoring, we conducted
a second experiment in which participants completed a time-estimation task. They were
given feedback on the accuracy of their estimations while we recorded their EEG, and
were also occasionally asked to report their attention state. We found that the sensitivity
of behavior and the P3 ERP component to feedback signals were significantly reduced
just prior to mind wandering vs. on-task attentional reports. Moreover, these effects
co-occurred with decreases in the error-related negativity elicited by feedback signals
(fERN), a direct measure of behavioral feedback assessment in cortex. Our findings
suggest that the functional consequences of mind wandering are not limited to just
the processing of incoming stimulation per se, but extend as well to the control and
adjustment of behavior.
Keywords: mind wandering, experience sampling, motor control, visuomotor tracking task, fERN, performance
monitoring, time-estimation
INTRODUCTION
Mind wandering, or those transient periods of time during which
our attention momentarily drifts away from our on-going task
and perceptual milieu, is fundamental to human neurocogni-
tive function. In terms of neural architecture, mind wandering
episodes have been strongly associated with activation of the
brain’s default mode network (e.g., Mason et al., 2007; Christoff
et al., 2009; Kirschner et al., 2012), while in terms of cognitive pro-
cesses, mind wandering has been tied to fluctuations in executive
control (e.g., McVay and Kane, 2009, 2012). Such findings have
supported the hypothesis that regular oscillations in the depth of
our neurocognitive engagement with the external environment
is normative to healthy human brain function (e.g., Smallwood
and Schooler, 2006; Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood, in press),
and that a variety of clinical and sub-clinical cognitive patholo-
gies may be linked to altered patterns of mind wandering (e.g.,
Shaw and Giambra, 1993; Helton, 2009; Smallwood et al., 2009;
Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010; Elua et al., 2012).
Given that mind wandering is central to our neurocogni-
tive make-up, there has been growing interest in understanding
the practical consequences of slipping into a mind wandering
state. For example, when we mind wander, we now know that
there is a systematic reduction in the extent to which we process
external stimulus events at both the sensory and cognitive lev-
els (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2008; O’Connell et al., 2009; Smilek
et al., 2010; Kam et al., 2011; Hu et al., 2012), effects that can
arise regardless of whether the events are task-related or not
(e.g., Barron et al., 2011). In a corresponding manner, behavioral
motor performance reliably shifts to a more automatic and/or
degraded state (e.g., Schooler et al., 2004; Cheyne et al., 2006;
Weissman et al., 2006; Carriere et al., 2008; Smallwood et al.,
2008; Reichle et al., 2010), such that reaction times (RTs) tend
to speed up and error rates are higher during mind wander-
ing vs. on-task states (Smallwood et al., 2004; Franklin et al.,
2011).
Yet despite such findings, our understanding of how mind
wandering impacts motor behavior remains incomplete at best.
Considered from a motor perspective, the range of potential
mind wandering effects on behavioral control concerns more
than just the speed and accuracy of response selection and the
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degree of response automaticity. In addition, the normal control
of movement also involves the ability to adaptively monitor and
adjust our motor outputs on a moment-to-moment basis as
needed. Given that mind wandering attenuates the sensory and
cognitive processing of external stimulus inputs, the goal of our
study was to determine whether this may have a corresponding
effect on our ability to dynamically adjust our motor behav-
ior on-line in response to shifting, unpredictable environmental
conditions.
In our first experiment we addressed the question using a
canonical visuomotor tracking task that allowed us tomeasure the
magnitude of continuous tracking error as a function of whether
or not participants were in a mind wandering state. Tracking
error did in fact increase during mind wandering. In our second
experiment we examined whether this effect of mind wander-
ing on behavior would generalize to a qualitatively distinct form
of response monitoring and control—namely, feedback learn-
ing in the context of a time-estimation task. We again found
behavioral evidence of the impact of mind wandering on the
dynamic control of motor outputs, an effect that co-occurred
with attenuations in direct, event-related potential (ERP) mea-
sures of performance monitoring processes in cortex.
In both experiments we relied on “experience sampling” as a
means of determining the attention state of our participants over
time (e.g., Schooler et al., 2011). Considered to be a “direct” mea-
sure of mind wandering, experience sampling relies on the fact
that if prompted, we can reliably report on the content of our
thoughts at any given moment and further, determine whether
they center on the on-going task being performed (referred to as
an “on-task” state), or alternatively, whether they have drifted off
to other times, places, or issues (referred to as an “off-task” or
“mind wandering” state) (for a review, see Gruberger et al., 2011).
Although the act of reporting on one’s thought state interferes
with the content of consciousness itself (e.g., Filler and Giambra,
1973), by using the report to categorize a participant’s atten-
tional state in the 10–15 s immediately prior to the report, the
methodology has been used to demonstrate reliable and replica-
ble differences in neurocognitive functioning between “on-task”
and “off-task” or “mind wandering” states (e.g., Smallwood et al.,
2004; McKiernan et al., 2006; Mason et al., 2007; Smallwood et al.,
2008; Christoff et al., 2009; Franklin et al., 2011; Kam et al., 2011;
Stawarczyk et al., 2011; Kirschner et al., 2012). As such, in adopt-
ing this methodology here, our approach to defining attentional
states aligned with widely-accepted norms in the field of mind
wandering research.
EXPERIMENT 1
In the first experiment, participants performed a visuomotor
tracking task. They were stopped at unpredictable intervals and
asked to report on whether their attention at that moment was
“on-task” or whether they were “mind wandering.” To examine
the influence of mind wandering on motor control, we compared
the error in tracking performance between on-task and mind
wandering states. Given that disruptive effects of mind wander-
ing extend beyond perceptual and cognitive processes to response
selection, we predicted there would be more errors during mind
wandering relative to on-task states.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-two participants completed the experiment in exchange
for one course credit. They were all right handed, with no history
of neurological problems and had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Participants provided written informed consent to the
experimental procedure. The Clinical Research Ethics Board at
the University of British Columbia approved this study.
Task paradigm and procedures
Participants performed a visuomotor tracking task (Boyd and
Winstein, 2004; Boyd and Linsdell, 2009), in which they con-
tinuously tracked a target moving in sine-cosine waveform on a
computer monitor by controlling the position of a cursor using
a joystick. The target appeared as an open white circle and par-
ticipant’s movements were represented as a filled red dot on the
monitor. The paradigm is shown in Figure 1. The task was to
track the vertical path of the target with the joystick as accurately
as possible. Joystick position sampling and stimuli presentation
were both at 60Hz, using custom software developed on the
LabView platform (v. 7.1; National Instruments Co.).
There were 14 blocks of varying duration; lasting from 48
to 192 s. Each trial was 32 s long, tracking the target from
left to right across a 17′′ computer screen. Trials contained
a 2 s baseline and 30 s of tracking a unique sine-cosine seg-
ment; each 30 s waveform was unique and could not be learned,
thus participants were required to attend to visual stimuli
in order to track accurately. The pattern of target move-
ment was predefined and modified from Wulf and Schmidt’s
method (1997). Waveforms were generated using the polyno-
mial equation with the following general form (cf. Wulf and
Schmidt’s, 1997), using randomly inserted coefficients ranging
from −5 to 5:
f (x) = b0 + a1 sin(x)+ b1 cos(x) + a2 sin(2x)
+ b2 cos(2x) + · · · + a6 sin(6x) + b6 cos(6x).
Importantly, neither the target or participants’ movements left
a trail, thus participants could not visualize the entire target
FIGURE 1 | Task paradigm of Experiment 1. Participants were instructed
to continuously track a moving target across the computer monitor using a
joystick.
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pattern. To control of waveform difficulty across participants,
each practiced the same set of random waveforms.
Our primary behavioral measure was the changes in root mean
squared error (RMSE), which reflects the overall tracking error
in the kinematic pattern. It is the average difference between the
target pattern and participantmovements (cf. Boyd andWinstein,
2004). The RMSE is calculated as follows:
RMSE =
n∑
i= 1
{
(xi − Ti)2/n
}1/2
Task-related attention
To measure task-related attention, participants were instructed
to report their “attentional state” at the end of each block.
Specifically, they were asked to identify their state immediately
prior to the block termination as either being “on-task” (fully
attentive to task performance), or “mind wandering” (unatten-
tive to the task) at the block’s end. Importantly, participants were
provided with descriptions and examples of these two attentional
states prior to the testing session. “On-task” states were defined as
when one’s attention was firmly directed toward the task, whereas
“mind wandering” states were described as when one is think-
ing about other things than just the task. Attentional reports
were recorded at the conclusion of each block, and these reports
were then used to sort behavioral data based on “on-task” vs.
“mind wandering” states. As mentioned above, block duration
was randomly varied between 48 and 192 s in order to minimize
predictability of block completion and maximize variability of
attentional state at the time of block completion. The duration
of the task itself was approximately 30min.
Statistical analysis
In terms of comparing on-task vs. mind wandering states, the
periodicity of shifts in these attentional states tends to approxi-
mate 10–15 s (e.g., Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos, 2007; Christoff
et al., 2009). We thus examined the movement data in the last 12 s
prior to the subjective report of each attentional state prompted
by the probes (cf. Smallwood et al., 2008; Kam et al., 2011).
Specifically, we conducted paired-samples t-tests to compare the
RMSEs by averaging together data in the 12 s preceding each of
the two attentional states (on-task vs. mind wandering) report.
Although we had no knowledge as to how long participants
had actually been in a particular attentional state at the time
a subjective report was given, our analyses were based on the
assumption and recent evidence (Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos,
2007; Christoff et al., 2009) that the 12 s prior to each report
would, on average, reliably capture the given attentional state.
RESULTS
Tracking performance
Participants completed 14 trial blocks, of which 43% were
reported as “on-task” and 57% as “mind wandering”—a typ-
ical breakdown of attentional states (Smallwood et al., 2008;
Kam et al., 2011). The motor tracking performance, indexed by
the RMSE, was examined as a function of participants’ atten-
tional states. The RMSE preceding reports of mind wander-
ing (M = 4.71, SD = 1.90) appeared to be much greater than
those preceding on-task reports (M = 3.93, SD = 0.70). This was
confirmed by a significant paired-samples t-test (t(21) = −2.23,
p = 0.03).
DISCUSSION
In Experiment 1, we found greater error in motor tracking just
preceding reports of mind wandering relative to reports of on-
task. This suggests that mind wandering does impair the precision
at which we control our motor behavior on a moment-to-
moment basis. Given the lack of external feedback on the partic-
ipants’ performance, however, it is unclear whether the increased
tracking error during mind wandering was due to visual sensory
attenuation per se (Kam et al., 2011), or whether mind wander-
ing can also down-regulate behavioral/performance monitoring.
We addressed this question in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
We recorded participants’ EEG as they performed a simple time-
estimation task during which they received trial-by-trial feedback
on the accuracy of their responses and were occasionally asked to
report their attention state at that moment as “on-task” or “mind
wandering.” To determine the impact of mind wandering on per-
formance monitoring, we measured the feedback error-related
negativity (fERN) elicited by task feedback in the intervals imme-
diately preceding “on-task” vs. “mind wandering” reports. In
particular, the fERN is an endogenously-evoked ERP component
that indexes the extent to which we aremonitoring the accuracy of
our responses, such that its amplitude positively covaries with the
magnitude of behavioral assessment (Miltner et al., 1997; Holroyd
and Krigolson, 2007; Krigolson et al., 2009). If mind wandering
attenuates feedback monitoring, then it predicted that the fERN
would be lower in amplitude during periods of mind wandering
vs. on-task attentional states.
METHODS
Participants
Fifteen participants (9 females;M = 24.8 years, SD = 2.20) com-
pleted the experiment in exchange for $20 (Canadian dollars).
They were all right handed, with no history of neurological prob-
lems and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants
provided written informed consent to the experimental proce-
dure. This study was approved by the Clinical Research Ethics
Board at the University of British Columbia.
Stimuli and paradigm
We recorded EEG and behavioral data while participants per-
formed a time-estimation task (cf. Miltner et al., 1997; Holroyd
and Krigolson, 2007). On each trial, participants were required to
estimate the duration of one second by pressing a button after
an initial auditory cue. The cue was presented at 3000Hz for
25ms. Following the participant’s estimate, a feedback stimulus
was visually presented for 1000ms at fixation to indicate the accu-
racy of the guess. After the offset of the feedback stimulus, a blank
screen was presented for 400, 500, or 600ms. Therefore, each trial
lasted approximately between 2400 and 2600ms (i.e., 2500ms on
average). A trial was considered correct if a participant’s response
occurred within a window of time centered around one second
(±100ms), and was considered incorrect otherwise. In order to
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maintain a global probability of approximately 0.5 for correct
and incorrect feedback stimulus, the size of the response win-
dow decreased by 10ms each time a participant was correct, and
increased by 10ms each time a participant was incorrect.
Behavioral measure
We determined the mean absolute change in response time fol-
lowing correct and error feedback as a function of participants’
attentional states. That is, the absolute difference in time estimates
between the current and previous trial was calculated in per-
centages for each participant (cf. Holroyd and Krigolson, 2007),
separately for correct and error feedback during on-task and
mind wandering states. This measure allows us to examine par-
ticipants’ sensitivity to their own behavioral performance as a
function of attentional state.
Task-related attention
Attentional reports were recorded at the conclusion of each trial
block, and these reports were then used to sort ERP data based
on “on-task” vs. “mind wandering” states. The protocol for mea-
suring task-related attention is identical to Experiment 1 with the
following exceptions. The block duration itself was randomly var-
ied between 30 and 90 s (i.e., 12–36 trials), and the duration of the
task itself was approximately 65min.
Electrophysiological recording and analysis
During the task, electroencephalograms (EEGs) were recorded
from 32 active electrodes using a Biosemi Active-Two amplifier
system. All EEG activity was recorded relative to two addi-
tional electrodes located over medial-parietal cortex (CMS/DRL),
amplified with a gain of 0.5 and digitized on-line at a sampling
rate of 256 samples per-second. To ensure proper eye fixation
and allow for the correction and/or removal of events associated
with eye movement artifacts, vertical and horizontal electroocu-
lograms (EOGs) were also recorded—the vertical EOGs from an
electrode inferior to the right eye, and the horizontal EOGs from
two electrodes on the right and left outer canthus. Offline, com-
puterized artifact rejection was used to eliminate trials during
which detectable eye movements and blinks occurred. These eye
artifacts were detected by identifying the minimum and max-
imum voltage values on all recorded EOG channels from −50
to 600ms post visual feedback stimulus for each event epoch,
and then removing the trial from subsequent signal averaging
if that value exceeded 150µV, a value calibrated to capture all
blinks and eye movements exceeding approximately 1◦ of visual
angle. For each participant, ERPs for each condition of interest
were averaged into 3000ms epochs, beginning 1500ms before
visual feedback stimulus onset. Subsequently, all ERPs were alge-
braically re-referenced to the average of the left and right mastoid
signals, and filtered with a low-pass Gaussian filter (25.6 Hz half-
amplitude cut-off) to eliminate any residual high-frequency arti-
facts in the waveforms. The resulting ERPs were used to generate
grand-averaged waveforms.
Statistical analysis
Statistical quantification of ERP data was based on minimum
peak and mean amplitude measures relative to a −200 to 0ms
pre-stimulus baseline. In particular, we derived “difference waves”
for the on-task andmindwandering conditions by subtracting the
correct feedback averaged waveforms from the incorrect feedback
averaged waveforms for each attentional state and participant
from electrode site FCz, where the fERN is typicallymaximal (e.g.,
Holroyd and Krigolson, 2007; Krigolson et al., 2009), as it was
in our data. The fERN was then subsequently identified by an
automated computer algorithm as the maximal negative voltage
between 250 and 350ms on the difference waveforms following
feedback stimulus onset (see Holroyd and Krigolson, 2007) for
more on this peak-picking methodology).
Here we compared both behavioral and ERP responses in
the last 15 s prior to the subjective report of attentional state
prompted by the probes. That is, the ERP waveforms for each
condition of interest (correct vs. error) were based on averag-
ing together the EEG epochs for the six trials preceding each of
the two attentional states (on-task vs. mind wandering) report.
We extended the analysis period to 15 s prior to each attentional
report as an attempt to maximize the number of events to include
in each waveform average while not extending the window back
so far in time as to consistently capture the preceding attentional
state or transition period between states.
RESULTS
Behavioral performance
Similar to Experiment 1, participants completed an average of
63 blocks of trials, of which 44% were reported as “on-task”
and 56% as “mind wandering” (Smallwood et al., 2008; Kam
et al., 2011). To examine howmind wandering affected behavioral
performance, we conducted an omnibus ANOVA that had atten-
tional state (on-task vs. mind wandering) and feedback valence
(correct vs. error) as within-subject factors. The overall absolute
change in time estimates and the variance of these time estimates
during mind wandering periods appeared to be much greater
than on-task periods, as shown in Figure 2. This data pattern
was confirmed via a significant main effect of attentional state
[F(1, 14) = 39.51, p < 0.001]. Themain effect of feedback valence
was not significant [F(1, 14) = 1.03, p = 0.328]. However, there
was a significant attentional state X feedback valence interaction
[F(1, 14) = 8.95, p = 0.010]. Follow-up analyses revealed that the
absolute change in time estimates following error feedback was
significantly greater than that following correct feedback during
on-task states [t(1, 14) = −2.35, p = 0.034], but not during mind
wandering states [t(1, 14) = 1.93, p = 0.074]. While the adjust-
ment in time estimates during mind wandering appears to be
insensitive to feedback valence, this difference was nonetheless
marginally significant. Along with the relatively small behavioral
effect during on-task states, this set of finding makes it difficult
to draw conclusions about the attentional effect on behavioral
performance on this task.
Electrophysiology
Although the behavioral results showed evidence of decreased
sensitivity to feedback during mind wandering, we wanted to
first confirm normative mind wandering effects in our ERP find-
ings, prior to assessing the fERN. In particular, the P3 elicited
by target stimuli has been shown to reliably attenuate in ampli-
tude immediately preceding reports of mind wandering relative
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FIGURE 2 | The absolute change in time estimate (in percentage), with
standard errors. There was a significant difference between absolute
change in time estimate following error and correct feedback during on-task
states (as indicated by ∗), but not mind wandering states.
to on-task (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2008; Kam et al., 2011). To
confirm the reliability of our subjective reports, we thus wanted
to determine that there was in fact a general attenuation of the
P3 amplitude elicited by feedback signals immediately preceding
mind wandering vs. on-task reports.
Thus, we first conducted repeated-measures ANOVA on P3
with factors of attentional state (on-task vs. mind wandering),
feedback valence (correct vs. incorrect), and electrodes (Cz and
Pz) to establish the reliability of subjective reports of attentional
state. For brevity, we only report effects associated with atten-
tional state and feedback valence. The P3 elicited by the correct
and error feedback as a function of attentional state is shown in
Figure 3. This ERP component was measured at different time
points between the two feedback stimulus types because it peaked
at different time points for correct vs. error feedback, as can
be seen in the figure. Mean amplitude measures were therefore
taken across a 290–410ms time window for correct feedback,
and 330–450ms time window for error feedback. We examined
electrode sites Cz and Pz, where the P3 is typically maximal
(e.g., Polich, 2007). There was a significant main effect of atten-
tional state [F(1, 14) = 12.06, p = 0.004] such that regardless of
feedback valence, the P3 amplitude elicited by feedback signals
was significantly greater immediately preceding on-task vs. mind
wandering attentional reports. There was no main effect of feed-
back valence, nor an interaction between attentional state and
feedback valence (p > 0.829). Importantly, this main effect of
attentional state on P3 amplitude was consistent with the nor-
mative pattern for mind wandering (Smallwood et al., 2008;
O’Connell et al., 2009; Kam et al., 2011).
We then examined the impact of mind wandering on feed-
back processing, as measured via the fERN on the difference
waveforms shown in Figure 4. The waveforms elicited by cor-
rect and error feedback stimulus as a function of attentional
state are shown in Figure 5. As can be seen in Figure 4, the
fERN appeared to be attenuated during mind wandering peri-
ods relative to on-task periods. To confirm this, two single-sample
t-tests first confirmed the presence of a fERN in both the on-
task [t(14) = −5.43, p < 0.001, d = −2.90] and mind wandering
[t(14) = −3.75, p = 0.002, d = −2.00] conditions. Next, a com-
parison of the difference waveforms between on-task and mind
wandering conditions revealed that the amplitude of the fERN
was significantly reduced during mind wandering [t(14) = 2.22,
p = 0.04, d = 0.61].
While definitive conclusions about the fERN can only be made
with difference waveforms, we wanted to determine whether this
fERN attenuation during mind wandering may be driven by a
differential attentional modulation of the processing of correct
and error feedback. As such, we compared the ERP waveforms
of both correct and error feedback at FCz between on-task and
mind wandering states, using the same individually-specified
time windows as were used to identify the fERN in each individ-
ual’s difference waveforms. In particular, we conducted repeated-
measures ANOVAs with factors of attentional state (on-task vs.
mind wandering), and feedback valence (correct vs. error). We
found a significant interaction between attentional state and feed-
back valence [F(1, 14) = 4.907, p = 0.044], suggesting that mind
wandering was specifically attenuating fERN-related activity for
correct feedback signals. This interpretation was confirmed via
separate paired-samples t-tests, which revealed a significant main
effect of attentional state in response to correct feedback [t(14) =
2.691, p = 0.018], but not error feedback [t(14) = 0.158, p =
0.877]. Specifically, while the processing of the correct feedback
was significantly attenuated immediately preceding mind wan-
dering (M = 6.16, SEM = 1.21) vs. on-task (M = 8.63, SEM =
1.31) attentional reports, the processing of error feedback did not
significantly differ between mind wandering (M = 2.85, SEM =
1.09) and on-task (M = 3.04, SEM = 1.55) attentional states.
DISCUSSION
Using both behavioral and electrophysiological measures,
Experiment 2 examined the question of whether mind wandering
impacts the monitoring and adjustment of behavioral perfor-
mance. We found decreased behavioral sensitivity accompanied
by a reduced P3 to feedback stimulus during periods of mind
wandering. Our data also revealed a reduced fERN during mind
wandering compared to on-task attentional states. Consistent
with the finding that correct trials appear to modulate the
fERN amplitude (Holroyd et al., 2008), the reduced fERN was
specifically driven by a significant mind wandering effect on
correct, but not error, feedback.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of mind
wandering on the online adjustment of behavior. Using a visuo-
motor tracking task in Experiment 1, we observed greater errors
in tracking performance during periods of mind wandering.
Using a time-estimation task in Experiment 2, we found reduced
behavioral and neural sensitivity to performance feedback dur-
ing mind wandering states, suggesting that the disruption in
behavioral control could not be attributed to sensory attenu-
ation per se. Extending previous research showing that mind
wandering states decouple our attention from incoming sensory
and cognitive stimuli (Smallwood et al., 2008; O’Connell et al.,
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FIGURE 3 | P3 in response to correct and error feedback during on-task and mind wandering attentional states. The amplitude of P3 at both Cz and
Pz time-locked to the visual feedback stimulus was significantly reduced regardless of feedback valence during periods of mind wandering relative to periods
of on-task.
2009; Kam et al., 2011), these results suggest mind wandering
also disengages us from both monitoring and adjustment of our
behavior.
That mind wandering was associated with increased error in
a continuous tracking task is not surprising given mind wander-
ing has been implicated in performance failures in vigilance tasks
(Robertson et al., 1997; Smallwood et al., 2004) and response
selection tasks (Schooler et al., 2004; Franklin et al., 2011).
Interestingly, Boyd and Linsdell (2009) have implemented the
motor tracking task over four practice sessions to induce motor
sequence learning, and found that tracking performance at reten-
tion did improve as indexed by RMSE (Boyd and Linsdell, 2009).
Given this finding, if mind wandering increases tracking error
as we have shown in our study, this would not only lead to
disruption in task performance and accordingly the learning of
the sequence in the current testing session but it may also have
a disruptive long term effect on the learning of motor skills
over time.
If mind wandering is impacting behavioral feedback process-
ing as measured via the fERN, how does this actually affect
behavioral outputs? The fERN is time-locked to external sig-
nals of response accuracy, and is generated by a high-level error
evaluation system that is tasked with performance optimization
(Holroyd and Coles, 2002). As such, the fERN not only involves
detecting the relative accuracy vs. inaccuracy of a response, but
also reflects the extent to which we use that information for the
modification of behavior (Krigolson et al., 2009). Given thatmind
wandering leads to transient reductions in the extent to which
we process behavioral feedback signals, this suggests the func-
tional consequences are two-fold. On the one hand, as our data
confirm, the transient phases of mind wandering lead to direct
disruption on the moment-to-moment adjustments in motor
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behavior. However, given that the cortical processes indexed by
the fERN are associated with reinforcement learning (Holroyd
and Coles, 2002), this would imply over time, mind wandering
may also directly affect the trajectory or efficacy of motor learn-
ing itself. Together, findings from both experiments would suggest
that the more we mind wander, the slower and less efficient motor
learning may become.
Our report of a mind wandering effect on feedback processing
manifest in the fERN raises the question to what extent might our
findings be driven by these sensory and/or more general cogni-
tive effects of mind wandering? In terms of possible visual sensory
confounds, prior studies have found visual sensory attenuation
for visual stimuli in the upper visual hemifield (Kam et al., 2011)
but not for visual stimuli at fixation (Smallwood et al., 2008). As
the visual feedback stimuli used in our study were at fixation, this
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FIGURE 4 | fERN in difference waveforms (error—correct) as a function
of on-task vs. mind wandering states. The amplitude of fERN at FCz was
significantly attenuated during periods of mind wandering relative to
periods of on-task attention.
suggests sensory attenuation is an unlikely explanation for our
fERN results. Likewise, when we examined the P3 component in
our study, we found attenuation in amplitude during mind wan-
dering that was insensitive to the valence of feedback. In contrast,
in the fERN, we found that the attenuation in amplitude during
mind wandering was associated with a selective effect of mind
wandering for correct feedback signals. This functional dissoci-
ation between the P3 and fERN findings thus suggests that the
effect of mind wandering on the latter can not simply be ascribed
to its effect on the former. Rather, it would appear that mind
wandering can have a direct, independent influence on behavioral
feedback processes in cortex.
Finally, given our results, it’s also important to consider what
our data are not showing. In particular, the fERN reflects an eval-
uation of one’s preceding trial performance, based on delayed
external feedback signaling whether or not behavior needs to be
modified for improved performance. While the external feed-
back is typically presented in the form of a visual stimulus, the
nature of this feedback and its implications in behavioral perfor-
mance makes it qualitatively distinct from task-relevant sensory
stimulus. In contrast, the response ERN is another error-related
component that reflects the implicit aspect of response moni-
toring, whereby the internal evaluation of performance is based
on the response itself (Gehring et al., 1993). While our findings
suggest that mind wandering impacts the continuous adjustment
of motor behavior in the absence of feedback as well as behav-
ioral control associated with external feedback, whether it also
affects the implicit evaluation of on-line performance as captured
by the response ERN elicited by correct vs. incorrect responses
remains to be directly investigated. If so, this would provide
further support of the notion that mind wandering promotes
response-independent thought.
Given our findings, an important issue concerns how if at all
this relates to the attentional lapse literature. While mind wan-
dering and attentional lapses capture a similar neurocognitive
phenomenon, they do occur at very different temporal levels.
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FIGURE 5 | Conditional waveforms of on-task and mind wandering attentional states in response to correct and error feedback. The difference
between correct and error feedback appears to be greater during on-task states relative to mind wandering states.
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In particular, mind wandering is a phenomenon that spans an
extended period of time (i.e., fluctuations of 10–15 s) exceeding
a given single event, whereas attentional lapses tend to occur dur-
ing a much narrower time window capturing the lapse at a single
event level. Several recent theoretical and empirical papers have
supported and validated these two related models of attention
(Dosenbach et al., 2008; Esterman et al., 2012). Specifically, at a
theoretical level, Dosenbach and colleagues (2008) have suggested
there are multiple controlling systems operating at multiple scales
of time. Further, in terms of empirical evidence, the findings
of Esterman and colleagues (2012) suggested the occurrence of
two attentional states—one tied to the default mode network
(reflective of mind wandering) that is more stable and less error
prone in terms of behavioral measures, and a second one tied
to the dorsal attention network (reflective of attentional lapses)
that requires more effortful processing. That the effects of mind
wandering appear to parallel effects of attentional lapses actu-
ally lends support to the notion that task-related attention (or
mind wandering) and selective attention (or attentional lapses)
may exert similar forms of top–down attentional control on other
neurocognitive processes. In the case of attentional control of
sensory response, it has been suggested that there are at least
two distinct control systems operating in parallel—one associ-
ated with rapid shifts of selective visual attention (e.g., Mangun
and Hillyard, 1991; Woldorff et al., 1997) and another one associ-
ated with slower fluctuations in task-related attention (O’Connell
et al., 2009; Kam et al., 2011). In the case of behavioral control,
that Weissman and colleagues have demonstrated that attentional
lapses impair goal-directed behavior and are associated with
reduced pre-stimulus activation in the anterior cingulate cortex
(Weissman et al., 2006) and that we found impaired adjustment of
behavioral control are consistent with the idea that varying atten-
tional control systems appear to have similar impact on various
neurocognitive processes. Taken together, mind wandering and
attentional lapses do appear to be related conceptually, but future
work needs to be done to disentangle the overlaying attentional
influences linked to dissociable neural systems.
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